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West Africa is a paradoxical region when it comes to the tension between the nation-
state and the transnational. It stems from fundamental continuity of state power inherited 
from colonizers in postcolonial situations. The discursive grid of the postcolony is more 
robust than most observers would expect to find in a region like West Africa. Everyday, as 
opposed to formal-institutional, transnationalism turns out to be a more important. In 
West Africa, transnationalism is a tactical matter with regard to everyday life. There are 
not so much efforts to alter the discursive grid of the postcolony, but to begin to erect an 
alternative discursive grid, such as a joking kinship. Joking kinship ignores the discursive 
grid of the postcolony, and lays down in identity and imagination the basis for an entirely 
different, more transnational framework for political belonging. 
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There is no other place on the planet where political maps are so deceptive – 
where in fact, they tell such lies – as in West Africa.
Robert Kaplan “The Coming Anarchy,” 1994
The surface of this order is everywhere punched and torn open by ellipses, 
drifts, and leaks of meaning: it is a sieve-order.
Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 1984
Introduction
West Africa appears home to the most quintessential weak states of the 
postcolonial world. Most borders reflect almost nothing more than the 
caprice of colonial cartographers. States float above society. Governments can 
extract only easy-to-grab resources, coerce and brutalize obvious opponents. 
They are anemic when it comes to broad-based revenue generation, 
providing comprehensive public services, or “capturing” peasantries. States 
collapse on a seemingly annual basis, with some of the most celebrated cases 
of disintegration of order and political community clustered in this small 
region — Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, plus near collapses in Guinea-
Bissua and Guinea-Conakry since the early 1990s (Herbst, 2000; Hyden, 
2005; Reno, 1998). 
But this is a first glance, a journalist’s eye view from a taxi cab racing 
from airport to Hilton, the way a popularizer like Robert Kaplan (1994) 
oversimplifies West Africa. There are two other important layers missed in 
this superficial account. First, state and society across West Africa are woven 
together in what Achille Mbembe (1992, 2001) refers to as shared epistemes 
of the grotesque, of brutal, excessive displays of embodied power that 
constitute the postcolony. Even when the state collapses, the discursive logic 
and practices of the postcolony persist.
Even so, Mbembe tells a story that makes a fetish of state power within 
the postcolony, idealizing and reifying disciplinary power in classic 
Foucauldian terms. This misses the second layer of West Africa reality, the 
ongoing unraveling of postcolonial polity, economy, community, and 
consciousness through the weaving of new mechanisms of transnational 
connection across the region. This is partly an elite project of “building 
transnationalism,” of sometimes fairly deliberate EU-envy, sometimes more 
rooted forms of institutional creativity.
Drawing on Certeau (1984), it is also a “tactical” project, a consequence 
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of everyday life within the postcolony and through emergent transnational 
channels and symbols. Everyday life increasingly traces, in movement of 
bodies, in daily practice, and in quotidian imagination, webs of transnational 
linkage that work around, undermine, and eventually render irrelevant the 
postcolonial order. 
As we will see with reference to regional common currency, regional 
organizations, and regional imaginations of pan-ethnic “joking kinship,” 
everyday life rips open gaps and fissures in the grid-like disciplinary order of 
the postcolony. In part, this quotidian ripping and tearing helps constitute 
transnational spaces and circuits of interaction that turn the purportedly 
smooth and seamless order of postcolonial states in West Africa into what 
Certeau calls a “sieve order… everywhere punched and torn open by ellipses, 
drifts, and leaks of meaning” (1984: 107). The sieve is punctured with holes 
that make possible new forms of transnational interaction, imagination, and 
being. At the end of the day, West Africa, a world region dismissed as among 
the most pathological and primitive, turns out to be a setting for remarkable 
institutional creativity, rich in comparative lessons for other places unraveling 
the postcolonial situation in part as a consequence of transnationalism.
There are three layers to the analysis in this paper. First, we set aside here 
and now all too familiar, simplistic characterizations of the region, àla Robert 
Kaplan, as the location par excellence of state disintegration, child warriors, 
brutal civic strife, crushing poverty, endemic disease, butchering monkeys for 
meat and the like. While not entirely based in fantasy, this imagery, like the 
imaginary beasts depicted in West African “terra incognita” on 15th century 
European maps, tells us less about political and social realities in the region, 
more about the Western imagination and the place still occupied by West 
Africa in the ongoing construction of Orientalisms.
Second, in the section that follows, we switch guides from Kaplan to 
Mbembe. He helps us understand the region in terms of the discursive web 
that is the postcolony. It’s known elsewhere in the world, but Africa best 
illustrates its grandiose claims to majesty, its clumsy efforts at lifeworld 
colonization, its monopolization of everyday imagery of power, the way it 
constitutes and reproduces — even in the absence of the state itself — a set of 
assumptions, orientations, expectations and practices about the nature of 
authority and the exercise of domination. On this tour, we see some of the 
hidden mechanisms behind more durable and pervasive forms of political 
community than we might expect to find at first glance. The postcolony lives 
on, in spite of its institutional weakness, even given the ruptures and tears it 
suffers at the hands of everyday actors. Before we can make sense of the 
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tactics that produce a transnational sieve order (below), we need to first 
appreciate the postcolony as a would-be strategic order, however sundered.
Third, we consider the transnational dimension of the story. Yes, 
transnational institutions are emerging across the region’s postcolonies. But 
we are still a long way from meaningful, EU-style regionalism, and the 
integrating power of neoliberal marketization is actually rather weak here. 
Something else is going on. At a more quotidian, mundane level, everyday 
practice and imagination trace out transnational linkages and spaces. 
Drawing on Certeau’s notion of the transformative power of everyday life, of 
what he calls “tactical” action, I explore how would-be elites, as well as 
ordinary people, stitch together new pathways of interaction and myths of 
regional-scale kinship, history and community. These constitute a 
transnationalism of the everyday that eludes a political science of formal 
power, but is central to understanding how ordinary, mundane, lived 
experience rework national and cultural order in West Africa. 
Postcolony as Discursive Grid
For Cameroonian social theorist Achille Mbembe (1992, 2001), the state 
in Africa must be understood not in the way we think of the liberal modern 
nation state in the European tradition. This abstracts and falsely exports 
individualistic social orders, legal rational bureaucracies and secular notions 
of citizenship, not to mention an idealized balance between an official public 
realm and some zone outside of the state known as “civil society.”  The genetic 
legacies of the colonial state are too compelling to equate the African state 
with its metropolitan counterparts. 
Crawford Young (1994) makes a similar point, recognizing that 
colonialism built a “hypertrophic” state in Africa, overdeveloped and out of 
proportion to society in terms of extractive and coercive means, frail and 
weak in terms of social mobilization, service provision and moral legitimacy. 
Young evocatively labels the hypertrophic colonial state with the KiKongo 
term used to describe US mercenary Henry Stanley in the days of the Belgian 
Congo, and later to describe the colonial state itself: Bula Matari, the Crusher 
of Rocks. 
While many observers expected African independence in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s to throw off the yoke of Bula Matari and help found a new 
kind of relationship between state and society, this proved utopian. The 
structural legacy of the colonial state was too pervasive. Control of the 
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machinery of state by newly independent elites meant control of the most 
effective and expansive means to accumulate wealth, status, and power in 
postcolonial settings. Opportunities in the economy (such as they were) and 
in “civil society” (however amorphously conceptualized) were insignificant 
by comparison to the resources, privilege, clients and standing one could 
accumulate through control of the public sector. Giving up such control 
through the “gracious losing” at the heart of democratic politics, was a kind 
of political, economic and social status suicide for oneself and one’s allies. 
Democratic instability, coups d’etats, single party regimes, personal rule, 
prebendalism, neo-patrimonialism naturally followed. It turned out that the 
postcolonial state was as much Bula Matari as the colonial regime it 
supposedly replaced.
Young’s hypertrophic state, Bula Matari, creates a kind of moral dilemma 
of community and legitimacy. As Peter Ekeh put it so clearly and succinctly 
in 1975, there are really two publics in postcolonial regions like West Africa. 
On the one hand, there is an official or what Ekeh called a “civic” public, 
associated with the legacy of the colonial state, a legacy of coercive power, 
brutal extraction of resources, arbitrary privilege, and moral illegitimacy 
stemming from alien origins and the ongoing abuse of power by postcolonial 
elites who could not but be tempted to use Bula Matari to their personal 
advantage. Against this illegitimate official or civic public emerges a series of 
informal publics that Ekeh labels “primordial” publics. The adjective is 
unfortunate, the concept sound. These non-official publics center around 
non-state forms of association which seem historic and culturally rooted 
(Ekeh does treat them as recent cultural concoctions (see, for example, p. 
105), in no way essentialist features of a timeless past, thus the trouble with 
calling them “primordial”). They are invested with all the legitimacy and 
public morality lacking in the official or civic public. They are alternative 
zones of association, sometimes centered on kin, or on ethnicity, or religion, 
other forms of solidarity. One voluntarily makes sacrifices for these unofficial 
publics. When possible, one steals from or ignores the needs of the central 
official public for the sake of the unofficial public. The tension between the 
two renders the state structurally weak and increasingly illegitimate in the 
postcolonial situation.
Achille Mbembe builds on Young, Ekeh and others to deepen this 
understanding of the fundamental continuity of state power inherited from 
colonizers in postcolonial situations. For Mbembe this continuity is so 
profound that it makes sense to simply re-label the supposedly sovereign 
territory bequeathed by independence as “the postcolony.”  Riffing Mikhail 
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Bakhtin, Mbembe captures the brittle, totalizing, omnipresent, fragile, 
overbearing, state power within the postcolony as the commandement, a 
totalistic, authoritarian polity that uses spectacular, grotesque displays of 
extraordinary, personalized power to “constitute its majesty” (2001: 24-28).
Mbembe instead insists that the postcolony rests on “a peculiar logic of 
conviviality…which inscribes dominant and the dominated in the same 
episteme” (1992: 10). Postcolonial subjects reproduce the same logic of 
lechery, consumption, domination, and sexual violence articulated by the 
commandement. And the commandement does not simply dictate: it is 
parasitic on these same logics and practices out in society. As society 
innovates new ways to shirk, to mock, to humiliate and brutalize within its 
own ranks, the commandement sees and learns, and makes popular practices 
of venality and violence its own, completing the circle of discursive mutual 
constitution. 
Even when the commandement disintegrates, even in situations of state 
collapse, the logic of predation, prebendalism, personalistic domination, of 
the grotesque inscription of power on the bodies of postcolonial subjects, 
reproduces itself in microcosm among many warlords and in “nanocosm” in 
acts of violence by child soldiers on civilians, and on other child soldiers (see, 
for example, Reno on Liberia (1994) and Hirsch on Sierra Leone (2001)). The 
logic of the postcolony persists even in the collapse of the commandement 
itself. It disperses out into society, ready for reconstitution in the new locus of 
postcolonial state power when the center re-establishes itself.
In this sense, the West African postcolony is hardly a “weak” state or a 
state that cannot “penetrate” society. It’s not a political form that lends itself 
well to phallic metaphors that separate state as phallus from society as orifice 
(Migdal, 2002). In spite of schizophrenic hypertrophy and incapacities for 
governance, it is more than anything else a discursive field, a way of thinking 
about relationships of power violence, control, brutality and extraction. 
Mbembe wants to argue that it establishes a disciplinary, normalizing grid, of 
course in the Foucauldian sense, because of its ability to normalize certain 
assumptions and patterns about the nature and use of power. Nothing 
demonstrates the normalization of this disciplinary grid more effectively than 
its replication out in society in the moments when the state itself, the 
commandement, ceases to exist (as in Sierra Leone, Liberia, northern 
Uganda, Somalia, Côte d’Ivoire, to name the most recent examples).
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Transnationalism vs. the Postcolonial Grid
Mbembe’s logic is impeccably Foucauldian, and thus impeccably 
insightful with regard to the formation, reproduction, and disappearance into 
the taken-for-granted of a certain disciplinary grid that constitutes the 
postcolony and makes the state in West Africa more durable and important 
than one might expect at first glance. But as we will see, because the 
Foucauldian logic itself misses how living within disciplinary grids is 
pregnant with possibilities for resistance, Mbembe’s African postcolony 
comes out more reified and stable than it really is.
Critically, transnationalism does not necessarily help constitute an 
alternative, globalized disciplinary order, and in some cases can ironically 
emerge as an anti-disciplinary, emancipatory force. This is not always the 
case, and it certainly would not be true in West Africa if the global 
mechanisms of neo-liberal marketization and associated cultural and political 
standardization were more pronounced. But they are weak in this region.
We can think of transnationalism against the discursive grid of the 
postcolony because here transnationalism is a force for regionalism and a 
light and incipient supra-nationalism. We see this at a superficial level in 
terms of regional formal organizations. We see this more deeply if we venture 
away from Mbembe and Foucault, away from pervasive disciplinary power, 
toward Michel de Certeau and the interplay between grid orders and 
everyday action that pokes holes in grids, making sieve orders. We then can 
see, in the final section of this paper, everyday forms of envisioning and 
making transnationalism in the realm of political imagination and cultural 
identity.
Organizational Transnationalism: Building an Alternate Grid 
Given the weakness of the nation state in West Africa, one might expect 
the region to be ripe for transnational reformulation. There is some evidence 
that this reformulation is taking place at the level of formal regional 
organizations. While these are not trivial, they are incomplete, partial, and 
like the state itself, tend to float above society. Everyday, as opposed to 
formal-institutional, transnationalism, turns out to be a more important, if 
elusive, force, as we’ll see below.
Weak states of the region have long banded together to form regional 
organizations with varying degrees of responsibility and importance. Some of 
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these they inherited directly from colonialism. For example, the fourteen 
francophone ex-colonies in the region shared a common colonial currency 
since 1945, the Communauté Financière Africaine Franc (CFA franc). 
Largely as a result of French influence, they never decolonized their 
monetary policies on independence, maintaining the colonial currency to 
this day, even after the metropolitan franc itself ceased to exist in 2002 with 
the advent of the euro (Daffé, 2009). On the surface, it would seem that 
francophone West Africa enjoyed a Maastricht level of currency integration 
for decades before the realization of a common currency in Europe. 
But this belies the fact that the CFA franc is and always has been a fictive 
currency, a kind of West African monopoly money. The currency is pegged at 
a fixed rate to the euro; before the euro it was pegged directly to the French 
franc. The currency does not trade on international markets, and its value 
reflects the strength or weakness of the EU economy, not the particularities of 
growth, inflation, investment potential and the like in West Africa. Especially 
given the strength of the euro in international currency markets, the high 
value of the CFA makes it relatively difficult for commodity exporters (such 
as cotton producers across the region), whose comparative advantage is 
otherwise considerable (Touréand Compaoré, 2003) to compete internationally. 
At the same time, elites who can afford imported manufactured and luxury 
goods retain a relatively privileged position. 
Autonomous regional organizations do exist: the Club du Sahel, the 
Mano River Union, the Senegal River Basin Authority, represent real efforts 
on the part of weak states to develop joint policies for managing shared 
ecosystems or tackle common development challenges (Foroutan, 1996). The 
most extensive and effective such organization, the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) began life in 1975 as a mechanism for 
integration of economic policy and the promotion of trade and investment 
(Levitt, 1998). But its role in this realm has been largely to provide a 
consultative forum for national economic leaders and to offer advice. 
In the last fifteen years, ECOWAS became more renowned for its 
Nigerian-led efforts at peacekeeping in the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone. As the regional demographic and economic powerhouse, Nigeria was 
able to convert ECOWAS into a forum for its assertion of regional leadership 
in the name of humanitarian interventions in crises in the more fragile 
micro-states of the neighborhood. Abuses of power, petty acts of violence and 
corruption, and a fair margin of incompetence and unprofessionalism by 
ECOWAS peacekeepers partially undermined the cause of ECOWAS-led 
regional integration (Møller, 2009). But the fact remains that West African 
 Everyday Transnationalism and the Postcolony in West Africa 219
weak states did more than even the EU in the face of subnational conflict 
within their region. Whereas Europe had to stand by and let the US solve its 
mid 1990s conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Nigeria corralled its ECOWAS 
partners into at least attempting regional scale, transnational solutions to the 
collapse of state authority. The experience and lessons could lay a 
groundwork for better organized, better trained and better equipped efforts 
in the future.
More recently, the Senegalese president, Abdoulaye Wade, along with 
then-South African counterpart Thabo Mbeki, launched a major new public 
relations, aid, and investment promoting initiative to (re-)build regional 
transportation and economic infrastructure — the New Economic Plan for 
African Development (NEPAD). Wade spent a good part of his first seven 
years in office parlaying his not inconsiderable international legitimacy (first 
opposition party leader ever elected to the presidency in Senegal, the most 
democratic and stable country in the region) convincing European, North 
American and Japanese development partners and investors that the future 
for Africa begins with an influx of capital to reconstruct infrastructure on a 
regional scale. The rhetoric harkens back to the heyday of modernization 
theory — the development engine will be private sector investment and 
industrialization, but it will be primed by public sector investment in the 
necessary infrastructure to attract investment. The kind of projects promised 
could indeed jump start regional trade, new flows of labor, and new forms of 
economic integration that would further undermine the weak nation states of 
West Africa. While the rhetoric of the NEPAD has been fully transnational 
and regional, the reality has been that Senegal and a few other countries have 
been the main beneficiaries of rather limited flows of new aid and investment 
in infrastructural projects. 
So the idea of formal organizational transnationalism continues to 
circulate in West Africa. Policymakers, business elites, even military leaders 
in the larger and more important countries have tried in various incomplete 
ways to transcend the limitations and boundaries of the region’s weak 
juridical states. These are not so much efforts to alter the discursive grid of 
the postcolony, but to begin to erect an alternative discursive grid. In 
Certeau’s terms, laid out below, formal organizational transnationalism is the 
building of a new “proper,” a new strategic order that competes with and 
challenges the existing strategic order, the existing proper of the postcolony. 
For now, the resources, political will and organization capacity to mount a 
wholesale alternative strategic transnational order do not exist in the region. 
But as the next section suggests, this does not preclude other, less 
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empowered, less strategic and proper efforts at transnational reordering. 
Certeau, Strategic Grids and Tactical Uses 
The real action in terms of transnationalism lies below the level of 
formal organizational innovation or large-scale economic investment and 
trade. In West Africa, as in many regions, transnationalism exists in a space 
of everyday action: literal movement of bodies without regard for borders, the 
flow of cultural products, and most importantly, the ongoing ferment of new 
forms of political imagination, membership and identity that tear at the 
discursive fabric of the postcolonial order. 
We’ll look (in the section below) at a few empirical examples of this sort 
of everyday transnationalism. But first, we need to situate this notion of the 
everyday in Michel de Certeau’s distinction between tactical action associated 
with use and consumption as characteristics of everyday life, as opposed to 
proper strategic action in the service of a discursive grid. 
Certeau’s (1984) paired concepts of strategic and tactical action help us 
understand the field of play in which to locate the three empirical processes 
central to this article: the discursive power of the postcolony, partial efforts to 
build transnational organizations described above, and the everyday modes 
of unauthorized transnational rupture discussed in the next section. Certeau, 
revealing his debt to echoing Lefebvre (1961), argues that strategic action 
begins from a “spatial position,” a physical place of power. It establishes a 
sense of “proper” procedures and operations, which it seeks to expand into 
new social domains. Organizations (think military organizations, 
corporations, urban planners, ministries of agriculture) occupy strategic 
positions of power, from which they expand a grid to order action, thinking, 
and the sense of what is possible. In organizing a military encampment, for 
example, one establishes locations for sequenced procedures: barracks for 
sleeping, parade grounds for reveille and surveillance, cantina for eating, 
training grounds for various forms of practice, cantina as bar for relaxation in 
the evening, etc. This strategic power uses control over space to designate 
when certain actions should occur, thus arranging proper sequences, a way of 
achieving a “triumph of place over time.”
The postcolonial commandement, as well incomplete, fragmentary 
efforts to build transnational organizations in the region, are both efforts to 
build and expand strategic orders. The first has the benefit of more than a 
century of colonial state formation; the latter is newer and more insurgent, 
but no less strategic. 
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Certeau offers an antidote to this Foucauldian totalization: everyday 
“tactical” action, small acts of appropriation and unauthorized use of the 
grid-like strategic orders in which we live. Unlike strategic action, tactical 
action does not originate from a “position,” a place of organized power, and 
so it cannot establish its own version of a “proper” to be imposed and 
expanded spatially. Lacking strategic position or command over spatial 
resources, ordinary-life tactical action relies on something more ubiquitous, 
available to anyone: surpluses of memory. Through tactics, everyday actors 
draw upon repertoires of former actions and memory to craft a new “move,” 
a “coup,” or novel way of acting or speaking which creatively “manipulates 
spatial organizations,” combining or juxtaposing features of the established, 
strategic order with remembered forms to generate a sudden novel 
alternative. Tactical action recrafts bits of memory to form new narrative, to 
make a “a story jerry-built out of elements taken from common sayings, an 
allusive and fragmentary story whose gaps mesh with the social practices it 
symbolizes” (Certeau, 1984: 102). In so doing, tactics pin their hopes on the 
clever “utilization of time” to introduce “play” into the “foundations of 
power.”
Tactics are characteristic of all forms of everyday action. Take cooking: 
we alter and improve recipes through improvisation. So no batch of 
homemade scones is ever twice the same. Walking in the city is just the same: 
despite sidewalks and well marked street crossings, we create an experience 
in use of the city grid by following our own personal, meandering pathways 
formed by the appeal of unexpected sights, smells, sounds, and encounters. 
Reading is an especially salient example, given its ubiquity. A written text 
is a strategic grid, with words placed on a page in a particular order. A series 
of ideas, stories, examples and allusions are spatially arranged to create a 
particular sequence of “consumption,” with a particular effect for the reader. 
But regardless of authorial intent, few people read serially from start to finish. 
We skim, jump to the end, look for especially interesting or relevant passages. 
Moreover, as we read any text, our minds wander, we are reminded of this or 
that experience, we look at something happening outside our window, we 
remember something else we once read, or some supporting evidence or 
countervailing example. Any given reading thus creates a distinct experience 
and a distinct reproduction in memory of an original text. There is creative 
power in every act of reading. True, no new physical book is created through 
this process of tactical consumption. Yet there is also no way to remove this 
ubiquitous power from everyday actors and everyday action.
Tactics, then, are “makeshift things.” “They are composed of the world’s 
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debris.” Ephemeral as they are, they do strategic orders. Although they don’t 
alter the spatial nature of the grid, they introduce “things extra and other into 
the accepted framework, the imposed order.” As a result, “the surface of this 
order is everywhere punched and torn open by ellipses, drifts, and leaks of 
meaning: it is a sieve-order.” (Certeau, 1984: 107)  
Thus, in distinguishing tactic from strategy, Certeau paints a picture of 
what we might think of as the “institutional order” of the nation or 
transnationalism very different from conventional accounts in political 
science and sociology. Where institutions, in these disciplines, create order by 
shaping, guiding, determining action, in Certeau’s world, strategic and 
tactical action generate, at once, a spatial and a “sieve order” — a grid torn/
punctured/frayed by time and tactical coups. 
Everyday Transnationalism: Tearing the Postcolonial Grid
In West Africa, transnationalism is a tactical matter, in the sense Certeau 
has in mind with regard to everyday life. This is true on many levels. Every 
day, private cars, mopeds, and horse carts smuggle thousands of pounds of 
cheap sugar, rice and cooking oil from Gambia (with its own low-value 
currency) into Senegal, in the overvalued CFA zone (Richmond, 1993). 
Workers illegally migrate from low wage, underdeveloped Burkina Faso, Mali 
or Niger to higher wage Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal or Nigeria looking for odd jobs 
of any kind (Adepoju, 2003). In so doing they take advantage of the 
ambiguous relationship between ethnicity and nation to “become” for a time 
Ivoirian, Senegalese, or Nigerian, adopting the language, customs and even 
surnames from the society they seek to enter (Ndiaye, 1992).  
Informal economies and migration networks of this sort abound in the 
region. They enable actors with no particular “position,” no capacity to build 
a “proper” national political order of their own to nevertheless “use” the 
spatial order of borders and national difference in the postcolonial grid 
system to their own advantage. Ordinary people distort and alter the grid in 
ways that produce transnational migratory and citizenship holes in the sieve 
order of postcolonial/national political space. 
At another level, of political imagination and identity formation, we find 
similar tactical operations of disruption that alter the postcolonial national 
political identity grid as well as notions of ethnicity and culture. This can be 
seen with regard to many symbolic repertoires and forms of cultural identity, 
such as religion, especially Sufi Islam and evangelical Protestantism (Villalón, 
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1995; Maegher, 2009), music, especially deliberate syncretisms of griot and 
pop forms (Tang, 2009), and sports, especially soccer and lutte or “traditional 
wrestling” (Onishi, 2002). For our purposes here, however, I will focus on 
fictive familial networks associated with the region wide practice of building, 
deploying and reworking “joking kinships.” 
Joking kinships are imagined bonds of relatedness that link a variety of 
groups in society. They crop up between grandparents and grandchildren, 
married people and their in-laws, major families within ethnic groups, and 
between some ethnic groups. The widespread nature of the practice suggests 
lines of tactical innovation and transformation, as discussed below. As 
observed in the founding colonial anthropological works on the subject,1 and 
in more recent scholarship (Stevens, 1978; Hagberg, 2002; Canut, 2002), 
joking kinship typically centers on regularized patterns of mutual ribbing, 
insulting and teasing, with primary themes of historic subordination/slavery 
and food insecurity. 
For example, in Senegal, upon meeting a person of the Serer ethnic 
group, a person from the Tukolor ethnic group might include among the 
usual greetings a jab like “Oh, you’re a Serer? Then you’re my slave.” To which 
it would be appropriate for the Serer person to retort, “No, no, all Tukolors 
are the slaves of the Serer.” Or Serer neighbors with last name Faye and Diouf, 
also understood to have a joking kinship, might follow this exchange: “Diouf? 
Diouf, you all eat too much.” “Oh, you Fayes, you can’t invite a Faye over to 
your house, because you will never have enough food to feed him.” Both 
parties might continue this type of mutually insulting banter for a short time, 
and greetings aside, move on to everyday conversation or the particular 
subject that brings them together. 
Beyond these regularized insults, the usual practice and rhetoric of 
joking kinship prohibits open conflict between metaphorical cousins. Joking 
kin are expected, in spite of (or perhaps because of) the teasing, to show 
special willingness to support or provide material resources when their 
“cousins” are in need. Moreover, it is widely understood that joking kin are 
especially suited to intervene in the internal conflicts of the group with whom 
they are paired as cousins.
As an ideological or rhetorical structure, joking kinship seems to deploy 
metaphorical cousin bonds or vague notions of quasi-kinship alliance to 
1 The anthropological classics on joking kinship from the era of colonial codification of culture 
include Radcliffe-Brown (1940), Griaule (1948), Richards (1937), Paulme (1939), Labouret (1929), 
and Mauss (1927). 
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conceal or redirect historical memories of past conflict and/or shared trauma, 
or to mitigate potential circumstances of conflict in the present day. Oft-
repeated banter about slavery and subordination support the idea of joking 
kinship as ideological salve on historic subordination, or hegemonic tool for 
maintenance of hierarchy (Foueré, 2004; Smith, 2004). 
Oral historical accounts I have gathered over two decades in rural 
Senegal concur, suggesting tactical innovation and reorientation of joking 
kinship. Practices that were once centered on relations within or between 
families have been scaled up to apply more regularly to inter-ethnic relations. 
For my informants and some outside observers, this reflects the end of overt 
inter-ethnic conflict with the early 20th century colonial peace. Widely 
recognized accounts of the deep history of the origins of inter-ethnic joking 
kinship are thus newly invented traditions (in the Hobsbawm and Ranger 
(1983) sense), promulgated recently to lend historicity to new social 
arrangements.2 
Where we see joking kinship, we see mutability, transformation, tactical 
redeployment of a resource that takes different forms in different contexts. 
The social dispersal of these lines of ludic fictive kinship suggests historic 
mutability. Joking kinships of similar form between ethnicities, families, 
in-laws, grandparents and grandchildren suggests a series of tactical historic 
redeployments of a familiar and usable trope or pattern to address a range of 
forms of social tension. 
The deployment of joking kinship interferes with and problematizes the 
strictly national identity grid of the postcolony by positing an alternative 
imagination of culture and community that presents itself as historically 
transnational in spite of the ongoing inventive way it is reworked and 
deployed.
Thus, Senegalese sociologist Raphaël Ndiaye (1992) argues for a link 
2 See, for example, the tale widely told in Senegal to explain joking kinship between Serer and 
Diola ethnic groups. In this story, two sisters, Aguène and Diambone, are said to have set out 
together in a pirogue (large dugout canoe), encountering a terrible storm that sundered the vessel. 
One of them floated towards the Siin-Saluum estuary and became the progenitor of the Serer people; 
the other towards the mouth of the Casamance River to become the founder of the Diola people 
(Ndiaye, 1992; Sambou, 2005a). Accounts such as Aguène and Diambone, or the founding story of 
the Bozo and Dogon joking kinship in Mali, suggest the diversity and tactical variability of historical 
origins of the practice. In the Malian story a Bozo mother, setting out on a long journey, once 
entrusted her children to her Dogon friend while she journeyed. When famine struck the Dogon 
community, the Bozo children were close to starvation. The Dogon foster parent cut off and cooked 
part of her leg to feed to the entrusted Bozon children, ensuring that they did not starve, and, as the 
story goes, forging a joking kinship alliance between the two groups. 
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between present day joking alliances and regional migration patterns. He 
suggests that over many centuries, as individuals moved across what are now 
national boundaries, they used existing and new joking kinships to insert 
themselves into local economic and political relationships. Regional 
correspondences between migrant and resident groups are made possible, 
Ndiaye suggests, by evoking the ancestral origins, alliances and movements of 
the various ethnicities now spread across West Africa. In this view, the major 
ethnic groups of West Africa descend from a small set of extended family 
clans historically rooted in or near the old empire of Mali. As these families 
gradually came into conflict, cleaved, and eventually migrated across the 
region, they retained memory of their homeland and heritage, even as they 
took up residence in new locales. In those new settings, they adopted new 
names.3 
Repeated migration created identifiable patterns of name transformation, 
so that an ethnically Bamana person from Mali named Traoréwould, on 
moving to Senegal, take up the ethnically Wolof name of Diop. Traorés and 
Diops are interchangeable names for migrants going from Mali to Senegal or 
vice versa (Ndiaye, 1992). Traorés are joking kin with Coulibalys in Mali; 
Diops with Falls in Senegal. When our hypothetical Traorémigrant sets up 
residence in Dakar and becomes a Diop, she immediately inserts herself in 
supportive and instrumentally useful joking relations with people of surname 
Fall in the new locale. In contexts of ongoing migration and fluidity of 
identity (accelerated in colonial and postcolonial times) joking kinship 
becomes a tactical, everyday means to evoke bonds of solidarity with 
erstwhile allies or with communities “descended” in the same family tree. 
Ndiaye himself plays transformatively with joking kinship. He makes a 
kind of tactical use of it that destabilizes national/postcolony discursive 
orders by envisioning joking kinship as part of the social webbing for an 
alternative, more West African conceptualization of political community 
(Ndiaye, 1992: 98-102, 125-127). In this view, the fluid, recombinant alliances 
of joking kinship are particularly visible manifestations of the region’s history 
of long-distance trade and the free flow of peoples, goods, and ideas across 
recently concocted colonial political boundaries. This suggests the basis for 
an alternative, transnational, pan-West African experience of political 
community. 
In this vein, some recent observers trace the origins of regionally paired 
3 The migration of the Gelwaar royal matrilineage from Mali to the Siin in Senegal is illustrative. 
See Kersaint-Gilly (1920).
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joking kinship (Traoré-Coulibaly corresponding to Diop-Fall) to the epic tale 
of political and cultural formation for West Africa, the Sunjata epic 
(comparable to the Iliad or Ramayana). Quasi-mythic founder Sunjata, 
according to recent interpretation, laid out the main patterns of joking 
kinship correspondence for the entire region in his 14th century Charter of 
Kouroukan Fouga, a founding document of the empire (Leach, 2000). 
Equated by some with the Magna Carta in its proto-constitutional 
significance, the Charter of Kouroukan Fougan provides, according to this 
relatively recent view, an alternative basis for political community which 
predates and transcends colonial boundaries and offers, through joking 
kinship, a distinctly non-liberal, yet inclusive basis for political belonging. 
For many, this webbing of new cultural history and everyday practice 
has resonance in terms of regional conflict management. In contrast to 
Western media accounts of the disintegration of postcolonial states into 
Hobbesian political anarchy (Kaplan, 1994), some West African intellectuals 
have picked up the logic of Ndiaye’s argument to suggest that joking kinship 
rooted in long-distance regional migration represents part of a real 
foundation for building regional economic and other organizations that 
could supercede the nation-state inherited from colonialism (Fall, 2005; 
Barry, 2005; Camara, 2005). For some, this might depend also on ceding 
nation-state autonomy to sub-national units of the scale of pre-colonial 
micro-kingdoms (such as, in Senegal, Walo, Kayor, Siin, Saluum, etc.). Such a 
move, which parallels the discourse on sub-regionalization in a newly 
federated European Union (Haas, 1986), appears both as a cure for regional 
autonomy/secessionist movements and as a “return” to a more “indigenous” 
and transnational political geography. Thus, the imaginative, tactical 
everyday experience of shared identity becomes the “software” that will 
animate and make useful and meaningful the “hardware” of transnational 
organizations discussed above.
Indeed, some political actors and intellectuals in West Africa go further 
to use the existence of joking kinship in the region as the explanation for why 
the 1990s tragedies of state disintegration were limited to “forest zone” 
countries. The leading Senegalese promoter of joking kinship as the basis for 
conflict resolution, Saliou Sambou, a former governor of several regions 
(including Dakar, the capital city) suggests “if only the people of Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire … Rwanda had these kinds of relations like we 
(Senegalese) have, they would not have experienced these horrors [of 
genocide]” (Sambou, 2005b). 
Governor Sambou tells a personal story of how this joking kinship can 
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work to mitigate conflict. In Njafaj in the late 1980s, a local conflict was 
brewing over succession to a Rural Community presidency in a village where 
I happen to have conducted field research since 1988. The incumbent wished 
to run for another term in office and had well mobilized clients and 
supporters who wished to install him. He also faced repeated charges of 
malfeasance and corruption, which had enraged a great many of his 
constituents during his previous terms in office. Both sides saw electoral 
processes as untenable, certain the other would rig the voting. Rumor had it 
that arms were being collected in anticipation of a violent confrontation at 
the time of the ballot. 
Governor Sambou, when alerted to the situation, came out to the region 
and convened a meeting of the antagonists. They came with large numbers of 
their supporters, many armed. Sambou acted tactically. By his own account, 
he decided to downplay his role as a regional governor, and spontaneously 
improvise, using joking kinship. He divided the crowds and insisted that if 
they wanted to harm someone, they should first harm him, their Diola 
cousin. He mocked and insulted them as Serer (hot-headed, impulsive, 
stupid, drunk; insults characteristic for a joking cousin). He reminded them 
that as a joking cousin, if they spilled each others’ blood, he would have to 
drink it: “did they really want him to have drink that much blood?”  He 
convinced the competing groups to accept his mediation, and worked out an 
arrangement whereby the incumbent Rural Council President stood down, in 
favor of a candidate whom the incumbent saw as a potential ally and the 
opposition could tolerate (Sambou, 2005a). Numerous respondents in the 
villages affected, when recounting this now famous local saga, insist that it 
was only because Sambou is Diola and evoked joking kinship (and certainly 
not because he was a Governor) that the conflict was resolved peacefully. 
This was the beginning for Sambou, it is worth noting, of his public 
promotion of joking kinship as a tool to foster ethnic cooperation, national 
unification and resolution of a long standing secessionist rebellion in the 
largely Diola southern region of the country, the Casamance. Since his 
success in Njafaj, Sambou has sponsored plays, television skits and other 
public re-enactments of the historic Aguène et Diambone origin story of 
Serer-Diola joking kinship. He has gone so far as to publish of a full-color, 
illustrated, large-print children’s book retelling the tale. He sees this as an 
effort to teach “a new generation of young Senegalese” about their culture and 
its “virtues” (Sambou, 2005b). 
In other countries in the region, similar state actors, as well as civil 
society forces, subaltern groups, and media outlets deploy certain images of 
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national political culture and versions of historical memory in the process of 
recrafting joking kinship in ways they find useful. Hagberg (2006) outlines 
this in some detail for the editors of the satirical Journal du Jeudi, a major 
public promoter of certain versions of joking kinship in Burkina Faso. 
Douyon suggests similar mutable deployments of joking kinship depending 
on who controls and seeks to use which cultural resources and memories in 
Mali (2006).
In the hands of cultural entrepreneurs like Sambou and his counterparts 
across the region, we thus see an effort to re-appropriate joking kinship — 
long an everyday tactical form of reworking identity — in the service of what 
could be a new “proper,” a new strategic order in then making, a new 
“indigenization” of the nation that might even supercede national frontiers 
and discourses of the postcolony. Joking kinship as means to national 
integration and conflict resolution becomes key to the political careers of 
people like Sambou, as well as the basis for an alternative formulation of what 
citizenship and political community might mean in West Africa. 
Conclusion
West Africa is a paradoxical region when it comes to the tension 
between the nation-state and the transnational. At first, one sees weakest and 
artificial polities, ready to disintegrate if one breathes too hard. This of course 
turns out to be an exaggeration that ignores the nature of Bula Matari, the 
postcolony and its commandement, which even if they cannot provide 
services and can barely maintain order in some cases, do constitute meaningful 
discursive grids. The discursive grid of the postcolony is more robust than 
most observers would expect to find in a region like West Africa.
This discursive grid is conceptual and empirically important. But like all 
discursive grids, it depends on strategic power to establish and enforce a 
proper. To the extent that there are still living human beings within that grid, 
they use, consume, tweak, alter, and perturb the grid order through the 
tactics of everyday life. Migration and smuggling show this in material terms. 
But people in West Africa also practice a tactical distortion of nation-state 
grid categories in everyday experience by transforming relations of greeting 
and mocking in ways that establish fluid new lines of kinship, membership 
and belonging. Joking kinship ignores the discursive grid of the postcolony, 
and lays down in identity and imagination the basis for an entirely different, 
more transnational framework for political belonging. Some elites notice this, 
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and have tried to make political hay of it.
At another level, the analytic shift inspired by Certeau — from discursive 
strategies to the tactics and perturbations associated with everyday life — 
reveals mostly ignored and critical dimensions of identity formation, 
nationalism and transnationalism. All of these structural formations should 
be understood as sieve orders, ongoing social, political, dialogic processes of 
making and tearing discursive, strategic grids.
It is not enough, as in the European Union, to build formal institutions 
from above and strategically call for and clumsily try to establish a “proper” 
of Europeanness or pan-European culture and identity that mostly means 
nothing to people (consider the rather abstract and socially sterile debate 
about Europe as a Christian region, mostly a means to deflect Turkish 
membership claims; see Foret, 2009). In that case, strategic action finds no 
resonance, no meaningful correspondence with tactics, and so the project of 
transnational Europe seems remote, alien, imposed by bureaucrats in 
Brussels. Europe is a strategic order with few sieve holes in it, insufficient 
nodes of access for human beings who by their existence poke holes.
Ironically, in West Africa, quite the inverse is true: everyday tactical 
action produces meaningful experiential forms of transnationalism, making 
the order of the postcolony a rather porous sieve. But when it comes to the 
building of a new, alternative transnational order of some sort, there are 
mostly holes, and a relative lack of metal structure to hold them together as a 
workable sieve structure.
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